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PURCHASES OF CORPORATE
INDEBTEDNESS BY A FIDUCIARY
OFFICERS and directors of corporations often purchase claims against
their companies for less than face value. There are good reasons for
encouraging such purchases: they may be made in order to save the
corporation from bankruptcy, or they may increase the incentive of
management to have the corporation prosper. There are, nevertheless,
some imposing countervailing considerations: the director or officer may
have usurped a corporate opportunity when he purchased the obligation,
or, if the director or officer thus becomes a creditor of the corporation,
there is a potential conflict of interest-under certain circumstances his
interest as a creditor may be the antithesis of his duty as an officer or
director. Without doubt he can always enforce the claims for an amount
equal to cost plus interest.' Under what circumstances courts will at-
tempt to discourage the purchase of corporate claims by allowing the
director or officer to enforce the claims for only cost plus interest is un-
settled. The need for a definitive statement of the law has long been
recognized,2 but the officer or director who must decide whether to
purchase a claim against his company at a discount finds only the opacity
of confusion when he looks to the law.
THE CONCEPTUALISTIC PROBLEM
The reason for this unsettled state of the law is that the courts have
used deductive logic in seeking to solve a problem of values. There is
general agreement that a director or an officer of a corporation stands
in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its stockholders.- There
is general disagreement, however, over the scope of his fiduciary duty.
Four cases in which corporate officials purchased claims against their
1 3 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS z8z n.42 (perm. ed. 1931).
2 ,[I]f directors cannot ... invest in the bonds of their own companies, except at
the peril of a constructive fraud; if they cannot safely buy such bonds below par, be-
cause they deem them unduly depressed; if titles to corporate obligations, passing through
their hands, become tainted by their touches-it is quite time that the courts should
give (what they have not given) a very definite and distinct warning." Seymour v.
Spring Forest Cemetery Ass'n, 144 N.Y. 333, 342, 39 N.E. 365, 366 (.895).
' Horner v. New South Oilmill, 13o Ark. 55i, 197 S.W. 1163 (1917); 3 FLETCHER,
op. cit. supra note x, § 838.
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corporations show how different conceptions of the fiduciary duty can
yield varying results.
The New York Supreme Court, in Inglehart v. Thousand Island
Hotel Co.,4 stated that the fiduciary owes the corporation no duty to
purchase claims against it that are selling at a discount. By adopting
this very restricted postulation of the fiduciary duty the court concluded
that a director or officer could buy claims against the corporation and
enforce them at face value unless there was evidence of actual mis-
conduct :
So also a trustee or director may, with his own money, purchase for himself
of a third person, a valid and subsisting outstanding debt owing by the com-
pany, and secure a perfect title thereto. Such a transaction is not even the
ground for entertaining the suspicion that it is in violation of any duty which
he owes the corporation, and there is no presumption of law against its fair-
ness.
Seymour v. Spring Forest Cemetery Ass'n took an amplified view of
the fiduciary duty:7
Unless some special fund has been provided, or some special liquidation has
been ordered, the director owes no duty to his company to discharge or buy
in the outstanding bonds, and may purchase for himself, because no incon-
sistent trust duty has arisen.
This case, then, reached a different conclusion from that in the Inglehart
case and allowed the director to enforce his claims at face value, unless
he bought them for himself when his corporation was also seeking to
purchase them.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in Hart v. Bell,' took the position
that any duty of self-restraint as regards an official's purchasing claims
against his corporation lasts only so long as the company is able to pur-
chase the claims:'
An officer or director is under a fiduciary obligation to exercise his powers
solely for the benefit of the corporation and its stockholders so as not to
divert a "corporate" business opportunity to his own use and benefit. Where
the opportunity is not "corporate," but "personal," such opportunity belongs
' 3z Hun 377 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1884).
'Id. at 382.
8 144 N.Y. 333, 39 N.E. 365 (.895).
'Id. at 344, 39 N.E. at 367.
S222 Minn. 69, 23 N.W.zd 375 (1946).
'Id. at Si, 23 N.W.2d at 382.
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to the officer, and he may treat it as his own.... [A] business opportunity
ceases to be a "corporate opportunity" and becomes "personal" when the
corporation is definitely no longer able to avail itself of the opportunity.
The court deduced from this view of fiduciary duty that, if the corpora-
tion is not a going concern, the director or officer may enforce discount
claims for their face value.
One of the most recent decisions on this subject reached a different
result from the previously discussed cases by ostensibly "logical"
analysis. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Weissman v. A. Weiss-
man, Inc.'0 held that the fiduciary can enforce claims against his corpora-
tion only for cost plus interest if the corporation was solvent when the
claims were purchased. This determination was reached by postulating
that a fiduciary must not take a corporate advantage for himself. The
court concluded that "obviously, it is of advantage to any company to be
able to purchase at a discount a liened debt against its property." 11
The inconsistent holdings of these courts are not the only results
that can be reached by hypothesizing on the fiduciary duty of a corporate
officer to his corporation. The trustee of an express or implied trust occu-
pies a fiduciary relationship to the beneficiary"2 analogous to that which
the corporate director owes to his company. The trustee's duty, how-
ever, is different from that postulated in the cases mentioned above:"
If the fiduciary buys up for himself such adverse or competing interest in the
same property in which his trust exists, he must hold it subject to the trust, if
the cestui so demands and tenders the price which the trustee has paid.
Since deductive or definitional reasoning has given no definitive
answer to the question under what circumstances an officer or director
may enforce claims against his corporation for their face value, perhaps
an answer may be reached inductively by analyzing some of the factors
that were determinative of the decisions in a few leading cases.
DETERMINATIVE FACTORS
In Wabunga Land Co. v. Schwanbeck,'4 a solvent land company
owned certain parcels of real estate which another company was sub-
10 374 Pa. 470, 97 A.zd 870 0953).
lId. at 474, 97 A.zd at 872.
"Earll v. Picken, 113 F.2d ixo (D.C. Cir. 1940)5 1 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND
TRUsTEES § z9 (i95i).IS 3 BOGERT, op. Cit. supra note 12, at 1o9.
14 245 Mich. 353, 222 N.W. 707 09,9).
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dividing and selling for it on a commission basis. The land company was
indebted to the selling company for commissions that had been earned
but were not immediately payable. The selling company went into bank-
ruptcy. The trustee in bankruptcy was anxious to receive cash for the
claim against the land company that would come due in the future.
One of the stockholder-directors of the land company bought this claim
for less than face value.
In a suit by the other stockholders against the director for an account-
ing the trial court made these findings of fact that influenced the Michi-
gan Supreme Court's decision: (I) both the land and the selling com-
panies were owned by one family of which all parties to the action were
members; (2) the defendant-director had told his brothers that the only
way the land company could purchase the claim at a discount was to use
bribery-an untrue statement; (3) it would have been advantageous to
the land company to have purchased the claim at a discount, and it had
the cash or credit to purchase the account without endangering its
financial position. The court held that the defendant-director was a
constructive trustee of the contract claim; he could, therefore, enforce
the claim for only the amount paid plus interest.
The fact that the corporation is closely or family owned plays an
unmentioned role in the determination of the equities of the problem.Y
The policy reasons for this are obvious. Because the financial position
of small companies may change rapidly, and because claims against
such companies are not frequently traded in a securities market that
would reflect these changes, a significant opportunity to take advantage
of the owners of the claims is presented. Furthermore, as a general
rule, the policies of a small company are greatly influenced by one or
two persons. If they had interests that conflicted with the company's
interest, their influence would not be offset by other disinterested officers
and directors. The shareholders and directors of a family corporation,
moreover, may have a greater tendency to trust each other; this is
true even when facts are disclosed that would give the disinterested
officers and directors of a large corporation reasonable notice of double-
dealing. Our first conclusion, therefore, is that the courts will limit
the directors or officers of the close or family corporation to the amount
they expended in purchasing the claims. The corollary of this is that
" See In re Norcor Mfg. Co., 109 F.zd 407 ( 7 th Cir. 194o); Weissman v. A.
Weissman, Inc., 374 Pa. 470, 97 A.2d 87o (1953); Thompson v. Mitchell, x28 Wash.
192, 222 Pac. 6x7 (1924). But see McIntyre v. Ajax Min. Co., z8 Utah x62, 77 Pac.
613 (1904).
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the officials of a large corporation with professional management will
not be so restricted in their purchase of corporate claims.'-
Another significant aspect of the case was that the defendant had
falsely told his brothers that chicanery would be necessary to secure
the outstanding claims at a discount for the corporation. This borders
on fraudulent representation, which understandably influenced the
court's decision. Other cases, however, have turned on a less flagrant
abuse of an inside position. Mere nondisclosure of the opportunity to
purchase a claim at a discount may be a key consideration.' 7 On the
other hand, full disclosure of the opportunity to the other directors and
officers, unless they too are attempting to secure the claim for them-
selves,' 8 will be favorable to the claimant's case.' 9
A third consideration in the Wabinga case was that it would have
been advantageous to the corporation to have purchased the outstanding
claims. Not only would the purchase have been desirable, but the
company could have purchased the claims without endangering its.
financial position. Of course, a finding that the company was actively
1( "In these times a large proportion of the mercantile, commercial and manufac-
turing business of the country is carried on by corporations, and many of them issue,
in large amounts, securities in the form of negotiable instruments, payable in the future,
which are purchased and held as investments by capitalists and others, and it has
never been questioned but that a director in a corporation of this character might pur-
chase the same of a third person at a discount, and collect from the company the entire
sum secured thereby." Inglehart v. Thousand Island Hotel Co., 32 Hun 377 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1884). See Hauben v. Morris, 255 App. Div. 35, 5 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1938),.
aff'd, 281 N.Y. 652, 22 N.E.2d 482 0939).
17 See In re The Van Sweringen Co., ii9 F.zd 231 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 314
U.S. 671 (194)j Young v. Columbia Land & Investment Co., 53 Ore. 438, 99 Pac.
936, rehearing denied, 53 Ore. 438, ioi Pac. ziz (19o9). But see Homer v. New
South Oilmill, 13o Ark. 551, 197 S.W. 1x63 (1917). In that case an officer's wife
and another person started a partnership to purchase the depressed claims of the officer's
company. The officer acted as an agent for the partnership in purchasing the claims and
did not disclose this fact to the other officers and directors of his company. The court.
conceding that there was an abuse of the position of trust, nevertheless, allowed the
partnership the face value of the claims. The only basis for this untenable decision.
was that the officer was not purchasing for himself but as an agent for the partnership..
In Glenwood Mfg. Co. v. Syme, 109 Wis. 355, 85 N.W. 432 (go), the president-
director of a financially embarrassed company bought the company's discount claims in
the name of a dummy. Even though he did not disclose his manipulations a suit to have
him declared a constructive trustee of the claims was dismissed.
" If the majority of the board of directors and the management are all participants;
in the purchase, any disclosure would be inefficacious. All interested directors should,.
therefore, be restricted to the amount they expended in the purchase of the claims.
Mothershead v. Douglas, z 5 Ark. 519, 221 S.W.zd 424 (.949).
19 See Hart v. Bell, 222 Minn. 69, 23 N.W.2d 375 (1946).
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in the market for such claims would tend to limit the claimant's re-
covery.' ° One case, In re McCrory Stores Corp.,21 turned upon the fact
that the company was actively settling claims against it-even though it
was insolvent, but not technically bankrupt, at the time the director
purchased the claims. The significant factor, then, is whether the man-
agement, using good business judgment, has placed the company in the
market for its claims, or, if not, whether it would have been advan-
tageous for the company to be in the market.22 Whether the company
was able successfully to purchase these claims apparently is not crucial.
A second illustrative case is Alexandrine Hotel Co. v. Whaling,23
in which the management of a hotel bought most of the corporation's
outstanding bonds for about fifty per cent of their face value during
the depression of the i93o's. At the time of this purchase the corpora-
tion was technically solvent, but was suffering severe losses. It had no
sinking fund set aside for bond payments and had never shown any
interest in purchasing these bonds. The management, however, had
done the best it could in light of the prevailing economic chaos. The
court took judicial notice of the fact that the depression had forced
down security values and that outsiders were buying up corporate bonds
for a mere fraction of their face value and then cutting out the rights
of other security holders.24
In a derivative suit to appoint a receiver, management was allowed
the full face value of claims submitted. The court laid great stress upon
the finding that the claims had been bought for the purpose of saving
the corporation and not for using the claims for speculation.2 The fact
that the management had never attempted to enforce the claims was
evidence tending to show the management's purpose.
Whether the fiduciary purchased the claim to speculate on its value
or to save the company may be difficult to determine, but the validity
"See Homer v. New South Oilmill, x3o Ark. 551, 197 S.W. 1163 (1917) dis-
cussed at note 17 suprz; Weissman v. A. Weissman, Inc., 374 Pa. 4.70, 97 A.zd 870
(-953).
21 12 F. Supp. 267 (S.D.N.Y. 935).
'2 Weissman v. A. Weissman, Inc., 374 Pa. 470, 97 A.zd 870 (x953) (dictum).
See Ripperger v. Allyn, 25 F. Supp. 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1938); Young v. Columbia Land
& Investment Co., 53 Ore. 438, 99 Pac. 936, rehearing denied, 53 Ore. 438, iox Pac.
2,z (2909).
323 Mich. iS, 2o N.W.zd 793 0945).
"Id. at 2z, 2o N.W.2d 795.
" Id. at 30, 2o N.W.2d 798.
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of this criterion is obvious.26 There is a great danger that an insider
who buys company claims for speculative or investment purposes may
be tempted to use his knowledge and position to enhance their value
at the expense of other creditors and stockholders. A positive policy
reason for this criterion is that it is undesirable to discourage the efforts
of a director who is willing to risk his personal finances in order to save
his company.
In re Philadelphia & W. Ry." considered the effect of bankruptcy
on the enforcement of claims purchased at less than their face value. In
that case the debtor corporation had been officially bankrupt for ten
years. The court, instead of appointing a trustee in bankruptcy, had
retained the management in control of the business. During this ten-
year period the directors and their relatives had purchased the corpora-
tion's bonds at a discount. Some of the bonds had subsequently been
resold at a profit, but others were still in the directors' possession. The
court in this case allowed the directors to enforce the bonds they retained
at the price they had paid for them less any profit they had made on
those they had sold. Bankruptcy made it clear that the directors' only
reason for purchasing the claims was speculation-certainly it would
have been ludicrous to argue that the motive was to save the corpora-
tion. The court articulated this underlying policy consideration: 28 "The
conduct forbidden is the purchase of the bonds of the debtor in order
to realize a profit." It is apparent that, even though a director of a
going concern and a director of a bankrupt company are both labeled
fiduciaries, the duties of the latter demand a more complete disinterested-
ness. One who is placed by a court in the position of trying to salvage
something from the company's assets for creditors should not be allowed
to place himself in a position where there is the slightest chance of
conflicting self-interest.
In Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Becker" an apartment house corpora-
tion had outstanding both a mortgage on its only asset, the building,
and some debentures. The corporation was in default on the mortgage
2-Solimine v. Hollander, 128 N.J. Eq. z8, 16 A.zd 2o3 (1940). See Bradly v.
Marine & R. Phosphate Min. & Mfg. Co., 3 Fed. Cas. 1172 (No. 1789) (C.C.S.C.
1879) ; Punch v. Hippolite Co., 340 Mo. 53, 100 S.W.zd 878 (936). Bat see
Lewin v. New York Ambassador, Inc., 61 N.Y.S.zd 492 (Sup. Ct. 1946), aff'd, 271
App. Div. 927, 67 N.Y.S.2d 706, appeal denid, 271 App. Div. oo9, 69 N.Y.S.zd 905
01947).
27 64 F. Supp. 738 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
" In re Philadelphia & W. Ry., supra note 27, at 740.
20 338 U.S. 304, affrmlng 173 F.2d 944 (zd Cir. 1949).
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interest payments when its directors submitted to the shareholders an
outsider's offer to purchase the property. If the offer had been accepted
the debenture holders would have received only five per cent of the
value of their claims. Becker, a shareholder, successfully opposed the
acceptance of the offer and in turn offered to secure a second mortgage
on the property if he and his brother were placed on the board of
directors. This proposition was accepted. Even though any share-
holder or debenture holder could have participated, the second mort-
gage was secured through Becker's mother and wife. There was never
any threat of foreclosure of the second mortgage although interest was
never paid on it. While the company was thus insolvent, but not yet in
bankruptcy, Becker's mother and wife purchased the debentures through
Becker, mostly from security dealers, at a very large discount. During
this period there had been inquiries about the sale price of the building
by outsiders; but no firm offer to buy it had been made. Later, when
the building was sold, the corporation filed for an arrangement under
the Bankruptcy Act. At that time it was determined that the company
could have paid a dividend of more than forty-three per cent to de-
benture holders. Upon these facts a federal district court held that the
objection of the indenture trustee to the allowance of the claims owned
by Becker's family should be dismissed-that is, Becker's relatives could
share pro tanto the face value of the debentures. The Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit affirmed, although there was a vigorous dissent
by Judge Hand. The Supreme Court also affirmed with a dissent,
The majority opinions in both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court laid great stress upon a finding that the defendants had no in-
formation not equally available to the brokers who sold the debentures,"1
apparently concluding there was no actual bad faith dealing by Becker
or his relatives. The argument was made that, because of the in-
solvency, there arose a conflict of. interest.3 - The interested director
was in a position to set the time when a petition in bankruptcy would
be filed-a time most advantageous to himself, but not necessarily
advantageous to other creditors. The majority opinion of the Supreme
Court countered this argument by emphasizing the advantages to be
gained from an interested director. 33 The majority admitted that the
closer a company comes to bankruptcy the greater becomes the chance
o 173 F.zd at 951.
"Id. at 9493 338 U.S. at 309.
"Id. at 317.
" Id. at 313.
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of conflicting interests; however, they did not indicate any point beyond
which the conflict becomes so great that the director will become a con-
structive trustee of the claim.
The dissenters adopted the rationale of Judge Hand,3 4 arguing that
once the company becomes insolvent the potential conflict of interest
becomes so great that it outweighs any supposed advantages. Hand
believed that, unless the interested director could show that he thought
both that the business would keep going through a composition of debts,
and that there was good reason to think so, the director should be
limited to what he paid for the claims.Y' In the absence of such evidence,
the policy reason for encouraging the director's purchase-that he
bought the claims to save the company-is gone. The dissenters in the
Supreme Court went so far as to say that the line should not be drawn
at technical insolvency, rather stating that "any evidence of the financial
instability of the corporation obligates the directors to overcome what-
ever presumption of conflict of interests between their own and those of
the corporation or of its creditors that such evidence presents."3 '
Great potential conflict of interest and lack of cogent countervailing
policy reasons have lead other courts to allow the fiduciary-directors only
the amount expended in purchasing claims if theywere purchased when
the company was insolvent.3 7 Presently, in claims brought in the federal
courts, however, absent fraud, bad faith, or actual conflict of interest,
mere technical insolvency at the time of the purchase of the claims
makes no difference as to enforcement of the claim.
SUMMARY
In trying to determine under what conditions a director or officer
may purchase outstanding claims against his corporation at a discount
"'Id. at 317.
3 173 F.zd at 95z.
s0338 U.S. at 37.
" Prior to the Manufacturers Trust Co. decision the lower federal courts, in bank-
ruptcy proceedings, had restricted the recovery of the directors who purchased their
company's claims when it was insolvent. In re The Van Sweringen Co., 19 F.zd 231
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 314. U.S. 617 (1941) ; In re Los Angeles Lumber Products Co.,
46 F. Supp. 77 (S.D. Cal. x94i) 5 In re McCrory Stores Co., 1z F. Supp. 267 (S.D.N.Y.
1935).
Manufacturers Trust Co. has not altered the restrictive policy followed by some
-state courts when a director or officer purchases his company's claims at a discount
while the company is insolvent. Mothershead v. Douglas, zx5 Ark. 519, 221 S.W.zd
414 (1949)5 Homer v. New South Oilmill, 13o Ark. 551, 197 S.W. z163 (1917)
(dictum) j Bonney v. Tilley, 1o9 Cal. 346, 42 Pac. 439 (1895)-
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and later enforce them for face value, logical analysis based upon
definitions of the fiduciary duty offers no satisfactory solution-or, at
best, conflicting solutions. Nevertheless, there can be deduced from the
cases certain factors that affect the outcome. If the corporation is
closely or family owned; if the director does not disclose the opportunity
to purchase the claims to the corporation; or if the corporation is actively
in the market for the securities, whether or not it is financially able to
purchase them, the courts tend to limit the officer or director to a re-
covery of the purchase price. If, on the other hand, he was seeking to
preserve the corporation and did not purchase the claims merely for
speculative purposes, there is good reason for allowing the officer or
director to claim the face value of the securities. In the case of a com-
pany that is already in bankruptcy proceedings, the courts will not allow
a director or officer to profit by his purchase. In the federal courts,
technical insolvency at the time of purchase will not influence the de-
cision unless there was an actual conflict of interest. Some courts, how-
ever, feel that a director should not be allowed to invest profitably in an
insolvent corporation's obligations unless he can show a strong counter-
vailing policy reason for so doing, such as an attempt to save the corpora-
tion from bankruptcy.
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